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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a problem of simultaneous
global cost minimization and Nash equilibrium seeking, which
commonly exists in N -cluster non-cooperative games. Specifi-
cally, the agents in the same cluster collaborate to minimize
a global cost function, being a summation of their individual
cost functions, and jointly play a non-cooperative game with
other clusters as players. For the problem settings, we suppose
that the agents’ local cost functions can be non-smooth, the
explicit analytical expressions are unknown, but the function
values can be measured. We propose a gradient-free Nash equi-
librium seeking algorithm by a synthesis of Gaussian smoothing
techniques and gradient tracking. Furthermore, instead of using
the uniform coordinated step-size, we allow the agents to choose
their own specific constant step-sizes. When the largest step-size
is sufficiently small, we prove a linear convergence of the agents’
actions to a neighborhood of the unique Nash equilibrium under
a strongly monotone game mapping condition, with the error gap
being propotional to the largest step-size and the heterogeneity
of the step-size. Moreover, we provide both upper and lower
bounds for the rate of convergence of the proposed algorithm. The
performance of the proposed algorithm is validated by numerical
simulations.
Index Terms—Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking, gradient-free
methods, non-cooperative games.
I. INTRODUCTION
The research on cooperation and competition across multi-
ple interacting agents has been extensively studied in recent
years, especially on distributed optimization and Nash equi-
librium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative games. Specifically,
distributed optimization deals with a cooperative minimization
problem among a network of agents, and has been applied
in many applications, such as parameter estimation, source
localization, resource allocation and multi-robot coordination
[1]–[5]. On the other hand, NE seeking in non-cooperative
games is concerned with a number of agents (also known as
players), who are self-interested to minimize their individual
cost given the other agents’ decisions. Such problems have
found great interests in the fields of transportation network
control, power network control, electricity markets, smart grids
[6]–[9], etc.
To simultaneously model the cooperative and competitive
behaviors in networked systems, an N -cluster game is for-
mulated. This game is essentially a non-cooperative game
played among N interacting clusters with each cluster being a
virtual player. In each cluster, there are a group of agents who
collaboratively minimize a cluster-level cost function given by
a summation of their individual local cost functions. With
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these features, the N -cluster game naturally accommodates
both collaboration and competition in a unified framework,
which motivates us to study and propose solutions to find
its NE. In this paper, we consider such an N -cluster non-
cooperative game. Moreover, we further suppose that the
agents’ local cost functions can be non-smooth, the explicit
analytical expressions are unknown, but the function values
can be measured.
A. Literature Review
A substantial works on NE seeking algorithms for non-
cooperative games have been reported in the recent literature,
including unconstrained or locally set constrained games [10]–
[13], generalized games [14]–[17], aggregative games [18]–
[22], games with dynamics [23]–[27], to list a few. The focus
of the aforementioned works is mainly on the competitive
nature in the non-cooperative games. Different from that,
the works in [28], [29] considered two sub-networks zero-
sum games, where each subnetwork owns an opposing cost
function to be cooperatively minimized by the agents in
the corresponding subnetwork. Then, an extension of such
problems to N subnetworks was firstly formulated in [30],
which is known as an N -cluster (or coalition) game. Then,
this problem has received a high research interest recently,
which includes [31]–[35]. In particular, the authors in [31]
developed an NE seeking algorithm based on an adaptation of
a dynamic average consensus protocol and the gradient play.
This work was extended in [32], where the players are assumed
to have limited access to other players’ actions. Then, both
a leader-following consensus and dynamic average consensus
protocols were leveraged to search for the NE. To reduce the
unnecessary communications and computations, the work in
[33] introduced so-called interference graphs to capture the
partial couplings in the cost functions. The N -cluster game
problem with a coupled inequality constraint was investigated
in [34], where the players’ cost functions are allowed to be
non-smooth. Projected operators, subgradient dynamics, and
differential inclusions were adopted to compute the gener-
alized NE. It should be noted that all the aforementioned
works require the knowledge on the players’ cost functions
to implement the algorithms. The most relevant work to this
paper is [35], where an extremum seeking-based method was
employed to search for the NE. This method requires no
knowledge on the explicit expressions of the players’ cost
functions, but assumption on the functions’ smoothness was
supposed.
Our newly proposed strategy integrates the Gaussian
smoothing techniques with gradient tracking. Specifically,
randomized gradient-free oracles are built locally to estimate
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the partial gradient information, while gradient tracking is
employed to trace the averaged gradient of the cluster-level
cost function. For a review of the relevant methods, Gaus-
sian smoothing techniques were firstly introduced in [36]
for general convex optimization problem, and have received
a renewed attention in both distributed optimization [37]–
[42] and non-cooperative games [43]. One major advan-
tage of such techniques is a free of the knowledge on the
explicit form of the cost functions, which is essentially a
nonmodel-based approach. Comparing with other nonmodel-
based approaches, e.g., payoff-based methods in [44], [45]
and extremum seeking-based methods in [46]–[48], Gaussian
smoothing techniques are able to work with non-smooth
cost functions, which leads to a wider range of applications.
Gradient tracking is popular especially for its fast convergence
while still being able to achieve the exact optimal solution.
Variations of such method have been extensively studied in
distributed optimization, such as [49]–[53]. This work adopts
the idea for the NE seeking.
B. Contributions
Comparing with the aforementioned literature on N -cluster
games, the main contributions of this work are threefold.
1) In terms of the problem settings, as compared to the
literature on N -cluster games [30]–[34], we further limit
the agents on the access to the cost functions: no explicit
analytical expressions but only the values of the local
cost functions can be utilized in the update laws. Such
problem settings have also been considered in [35].
However, different from [35], no smoothness assumption
on the agents’ local cost functions is imposed, which
increases the application range of this work.
2) In terms of the algorithm design, as most existing liter-
ature on N -cluster games [30]–[35] studied continuous-
time methods, this paper proposes a discrete-time
nonmodel-based NE strategy by a synthesis of Gaussian
smoothing techniques and gradient tracking. Moreover,
we allow the agents to choose their own preferred step-
sizes without coordination, which makes the algorithm
more distributed. In contrast to many consensus-based
algorithms where doubly stochastic matrix is required,
we relax the adjacency matrix to be simply column
stochastic, which simplifies the matrix design and makes
the algorithm feasible for a wider range of digraphs,
since not all digraphs admit doubly stochastic adjacency
matrices.
3) The technical challenges on the convergence analysis
brought by a non-stochastic adjacency matrix and un-
coordinated step-sizes are addressed in this work. For
the convergence results: we prove that, when the largest
step-size is sufficiently small, a linear convergence of
the agents’ actions to a neighborhood of the unique NE
is achieved under a strongly monotone game mapping
condition, with the error gap being propotional to the
largest step-size and the heterogeneity of the step-size.
Moreover, we provide both upper and lower bounds
for the rate of convergence of the proposed algorithm.
Simulations are provided to validate the effectiveness of
the proposed algorithm.
C. Notations
We use 1m for an m-dimensional vector with all elements
being 1, and Im for an m ×m identity matrix. For a vector
pi, we use diag(pi) to denote a diagonal matrix formed by
the elements of pi. For any two vectors u, v, their inner
product is denoted by 〈u, v〉; their weighted inner product
due to a positive vector (i.e., vector with all elements being
positive) pi is denoted by 〈u, v〉pi , u>diag(pi)−1v. The
transpose of u is denoted by u>. Moreover, we use ‖u‖2
for its standard Euclidean norm, i.e., ‖u‖2 =
√〈u, u〉,
and ‖u‖pi for its weighted Euclidean norm due to pi, i.e.,
‖u‖pi = ‖diag(
√
pi)−1u‖2. The projection of u onto a set X
is denoted by PX (u), i.e., PX (u) = arg minu′ ‖u′ − u‖22.
For vector a, we use [a]i to denote its i-th entry. The
transpose and spectral norm of a matrix A are denoted by
A> and ‖A‖2, respectively. The matrix norm ‖A‖pi induced
by ‖ · ‖pi is defined as ‖A‖pi , ‖diag(
√
pi)−1A diag(
√
pi)‖2.
We use ρ(A) to represent the spectral radius of a square
matrix A, and A∞ to indicate its infinite power (if it exists)
limk→∞Ak. The expectation operator is denoted by E[·].
For a function f , ∂εxf(x, y) denotes a ε-subdifferential set-
valued mapping of f(x, y) at x for any fixed y, defined as
∂εxf(x, y) = {g|f(z, y) ≥ f(x, y) − ε + 〈g, z − x〉,∀z}. If
ε = 0, we simplify its notation by ∂xf(x, y), which is the set
of subgradients at x for any fixed y. If f is differentiable, the
subdifferential mapping ∂xf(x, y) reduces to a single-valued
map, denoted by ∇xf(x, y), which is the partial derivative
with respect to x at the point (x, y).
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Problem Formulation
An N -cluster game, defined by Γ(N , {f i}, {X i}), is a
multi-player non-cooperative game played among N clusters,
where each cluster, indexed by i ∈ N , {1, 2, . . . , N},
consists of a group of agents, denoted by Vi , {1, 2, . . . , ni},
to cooperatively minimize a cluster-level cost function f i
with their actions subject to a constraint set X i. Denote
n ,
∑N
i=1 ni and X , X 1×· · ·×XN . Then, the cluster-level
cost function f i : X → R is defined as
f i(xi,x−i) , 1
ni
ni∑
j=1
f ij(x
i,x−i), xi ∈ X i, ∀i ∈ N ,
where f ij(x
i,x−i) is a local cost function of agent j in cluster
i, xi , [xi>1 , . . . , xi>ni ]> ∈ X i = X i1×· · ·×X ini is a collection
of all agents’ actions in cluster i with xij ∈ X ij ⊂ Rp
i
j being
the action of agent j in cluster i and pij being the dimension of
xij , and x
−i ∈ X\X i denotes a collection of all agents’ actions
except cluster i. Denote x , (xi,x−i) = [x1>, . . . ,xN>]>.
Without the loss of generality, we set pij = 1, j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N
for simplicity.
Definition 1: (NE of N -Cluster Games). A vector x∗ ,
(xi∗,x−i∗) ∈ X is said to be an NE of the N -cluster non-
cooperative game Γ(N , {f i}, {X i}), if and only if
f i(xi∗,x−i∗) ≤ f i(xi,x−i∗), ∀xi ∈ X i, ∀i ∈ N .
In this paper, we consider the N -cluster non-cooperative
game Γ(N , {f i}, {X i}), where each cluster i ∈ N is ruled
by a directed communication network, denoted by Gi(Vi, E i)
with an adjacency matrix Ai , [aijk] ∈ Rni×ni , aijk > 0 if
(k, j) ∈ E i and aijk = 0 otherwise. It is assumed that (k, k) ∈
E i,∀k ∈ Vi. Moreover, we assume that the explicit analytical
expressions of the agents’ local cost functions are unknown,
but the function values can be measured, similar to the settings
in [35] and [43]. We aim to develop an NE seeking strategy
to drive all agents’ actions towards the NE.
Assumption 1: For i ∈ N , the digraph Gi is strongly
connected. The associated adjacency matrix Ai is column
stochastic, i.e., 1>niA
i = 1>ni .
Under Assumption 1, it is known that Ai is primitive
and column stochastic, then we denote its right eigenvector
corresponding to the eigenvalue of 1 by vi , [vi1, . . . , vini ]>,
such that 1>niv
i = 1. Then, vi corresponds to Ai’s non-1ni
Perron vector with eigenvalue 1, and hence all elements in vi
are positive, and Ai∞ = v
i1>ni . Define ι , maxi∈N ‖vi‖2,
νi , nivi, and ν , [ν1>, . . . ,νN>]>. Denote the smallest
and largest elements of ν by ν and ν, respectively. With the
above notations, the following results can be readily obtained
based on the definitions of the weighted Euclidean norm
introduced in Section I-C, and will be frequently applied in
the subsequent analysis
√
ν‖ · ‖νi ≤ ‖ · ‖2 ≤
√
ν‖ · ‖νi ,√
ν‖ · ‖ν ≤ ‖ · ‖2 ≤
√
ν‖ · ‖ν .
Then, the following contraction properties of the adjacency
matrix Ai can be deduced.
Lemma 1: (see [52, Lemma 1]) Under Assumption 1, the
adjacency matrix Ai holds that
‖Ai −Ai∞‖νi < 1, ‖Ini −Ai∞‖νi = 1.
Assumption 2: For each j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N , the set X ij
is non-empty, convex and compact; the local cost function
f ij(x
i,x−i) is convex with respect to xi, and lij-Lipschitz
continuous in x, i.e., ‖f ij(x)− f ij(x′)‖2 ≤ lij‖x− x′‖2.
Remark 1: Assumption 2 ensures the existence of an NE in
game Γ(N , {f i}, {X i}) [43], [54, Prop. 2.2], [55], [56].
The game mapping of Γ(N , {f i}, {X i}) is defined as
Φ(x) ,
∏
i∈N
∂xif
i(xi,x−i),
which is a set-valued map, and will reduce to a single-valued
map if f ij is differentiable.
Assumption 3: The game mapping Φ of game Γ is strongly
monotone on X with a constant χ > 0, i.e., for any x,x′ ∈ X ,
Φ(x),Φ(x′) ∈ Φ, we have 〈Φ(x)− Φ(x′),x− x′〉 ≥ χ‖x−
x′‖22.
Remark 2: Assumption 3 was commonly imposed in NE
seeking works. It is known that under Assumptions 2 and 3,
game Γ admits a unique NE.
B. Preliminaries on Gaussian Smoothing
For j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N , a Gaussian-smoothed function of the
local cost function f ij(x) with respect to the actions x
i can be
defined as
f ij,µ(x) ,
1
κ
∫
Rni
f ij(x
i + µijζ
i
j ,x
−i)e−
1
2‖ζij‖22dζij , (1)
where κ ,
∫
Rni e
− 12‖ζij‖22dζij = (2pi)
ni/2, ζij ∈ Rni is
a normally distributed random variable, and µij ≥ 0 is a
smoothing parameter. The randomized gradient-free oracle of
f ij(x) with respect to agent k’s action x
i
k, k ∈ Vi, i ∈ N is
defined as
gijk(x) ,
f ij(x
i + µijζ
i
j ,x
−i)− f ij(xi,x−i)
µij
[ζij ]k.
Then, the following results for f ij,µ(x) and g
i
jk(x) can be
readily obtained according to [36].
Lemma 2: Under Assumption 2, for ∀j, k ∈ Vi, i ∈ N , the
smoothed function f ij,µ(x) and oracle g
i
jk(x) hold that:
1) The function f ij,µ(x) is convex, differentiable in x
i and
satisfies
f ij(x) ≤ f ij,µ(x) ≤ f ij(x) + µij lij .
Further, the corresponding partial derivative ∇xif ij,µ(x)
belongs to some ε-subdifferential of function f ij(x), i.e.,
∇xif ij,µ(x) ∈ ∂εxif ij(x), ε = µij lij .
Specifically, we have ∇xif ij,0(x) ∈ ∂xif ij(x) when the
smoothing parameter µij tends to 0
1.
2) The partial derivative with respect to xik satisfies that
∇xikf
i
j,µ(x) = E[gijk(x)],
and is Lipschitz continuous in x with a constant L ,
maxj∈Vi,i∈N
√
nil
i
j/µ
i
j , i.e.,
‖∇xikf
i
j,µ(x)−∇xikf
i
j,µ(x
′)‖2 ≤ L‖x− x′‖2.
3) The oracle gijk(x) satisfies
E[‖gijk(x)− gijk(x′)‖2] ≤ 2L‖x− x′‖2,
‖∇xikf
i
j,µ(x)‖2 = ‖E[gijk(x)]‖2 ≤ E[‖gijk(x)‖2] ≤ D,
where D , maxj∈Vi,i∈N
√
ni + 4l
i
j .
Now, we define a Gaussian-smoothed game associated with
the N -cluster game Γ, denoted by Γµ(N , {f iµ}, {X i}), having
the same set of clusters and action sets as game Γ, but different
cost functions f iµ, where
f iµ(x
i,x−i) , 1
ni
ni∑
j=1
f ij,µ(x
i,x−i), xi ∈ X i, ∀i ∈ N ,
and f ij,µ is a Gaussian-smoothed function of f
i
j defined in (1).
Thus, with Assumption 2 and Lemma 2, game Γµ admits an
NE, denoted by x∗µ. The following result shows the equiva-
lence of games Γ and Γµ under certain conditions.
1In this paper, we slightly abuse the notation µij to represent the sequence
µij,t just for easy presentation without the loss of generality. We mean µ
i
j
tending to 0 by limt→∞ µij,t = 0.
Lemma 3: Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Games Γ and Γµ
are equivalent and share the same NE when the smoothing
parameter µij ,∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N tends to 0.
Proof: From Remark 1 and previous discussion, Assumption 2
implies the existence of NE in both games Γ and Γµ. More-
over, applying Squeeze Theorem to Lemma 2-1), we have
lim
µij→0
f ij,µ(x) = f
i
j(x), ∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N .
Then, games Γ and Γµ share the same number of agents, cost
functions, action sets and communication graph. Hence the
result holds.
The game mapping of Γµ, denoted by Φµ is defined by
stacking all partial derivatives as shown below
Φµ(x) ,
 ∇x1f
1
µ(x
1,x−1)
...
∇xN fNµ (xN ,x−N )
 .
When µij tends to 0 for all j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N , we denote the game
mapping Φµ by Φ0, i.e.,
Φ0(x) , lim
µij→0
∀j∈Vi,i∈N
Φµ(x) =

1
n1
∑n1
j=1∇x1f1j,0(x1,x−1)
...
1
nN
∑nN
j=1∇xN fNj,0(xN ,x−N )
 .
Thus, Φ0(x) ∈ Φ(x) as a result of Lemma 2-1).
III. NE SEEKING ALGORITHM FOR N -CLUSTER GAMES
In this section, we present an NE seeking strategy for the N -
Cluster Game. Specifically, each agent j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N needs
to maintain its own action variable xij , and gradient tracker
variables ϕijk for ∀k ∈ Vi. Let xij,t, ϕijk,t denote the values of
these variables at time-step t. The update laws for each agent
j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N are designed as
xij,t+1 = PX ij [x
i
j,t − αijϕijj,t], (2a)
ϕijk,t+1 =
ni∑
l=1
aijlϕ
i
lk,t + g
i
jk(xt+1)− gijk(xt), (2b)
with arbitrary xij,0 ∈ X ij and ϕijk,0 = gijk(x0), where gijk(xt)
is the gradient estimator given by
gijk(xt) ,
f ij(x
i
t + µ
i
jζ
i
j,t,x
−i
t )− f ij(xit,x−it )
µij
[ζij,t]k, (3)
and αij > 0 is a constant step-size sequence adopted by
agent j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N . Denote the largest step-size by
αmax , maxj∈Vi,i∈N αij and the average of all step-sizes
by α¯ , 1n
∑
j∈Vi,i∈N α
i
j Define the heterogeneity of the step-
size as the following ratio, α , ‖α − α¯‖2/‖α¯‖2, where
α , [α11, . . . , α1n1 , . . . , αN1 , . . . , αNnN ]> and α¯ , α¯1n. The
proposed algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 NE seeking in N -cluster games
1: Initialize: j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N
set xij,0 ∈ X ij
generate {ζij,t}t≥0 ∼ N (0, 1)
set ϕijk,0 = g
i
jk(x0), ∀k ∈ Vi
2: Iteration (t ≥ 0): j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N
update xij,t+1 based on (2a)
compute gijk(xt+1) based on (3), ∀k ∈ Vi
update ϕijk,t+1 based on (2b), ∀k ∈ Vi
3: Output: j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N
xij,t → xi∗j
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
Let Ht denote the σ-field generated by the entire history
of the random variables from time-step 0 to t − 1, i.e.,
Ht = {xij,0, ϕijk,0, j, k ∈ Vi, i ∈ N} for t = 0 and
Ht = {xij,0, ϕijk,0, ζij,s, j, k ∈ Vi, i ∈ N ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t − 1}
for t ≥ 1.
We introduce the following notations. For ∀k ∈ Vi, i ∈ N ,
ϕik,t , [ϕi1k,t, . . . , ϕinik,t]
>, ϕ¯ik,t ,
1
ni
1>niϕ
i
k,t,
ϕt , [ϕ111,t, . . . , ϕ1n1n1,t, . . . , ϕ
N
11,t, . . . , ϕ
N
nNnN ,t]
>,
gik , [gi1k, . . . , ginik]
>, g¯ik ,
1
ni
1>nig
i
k,
∇xik f
i
µ , [∇xikf
i
1,µ, . . . ,∇xikf
i
ni,µ]
>.
Then, the concatenated form of the update laws (2) reads
xt+1 = PX [xt − diag(α)ϕt], (4a)
ϕik,t+1 = A
iϕik,t + g
i
k(xt+1)− gik(xt). (4b)
Now, we are able to derive some results for the averaged
gradient tracker ϕ¯ik,t, summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the averaged gradi-
ent tracker ϕ¯ik,t,∀k ∈ Vi, i ∈ N holds that
1) ϕ¯ik,t = g¯
i
k(xt),
2) E[ϕ¯ik,t|Ht] = ∇xikf
i
µ(xt),
3) E[‖ϕ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖22|Ht] ≤ 4D2/ni.
Proof: For 1), multiplying 1ni1
>
ni from the left on both sides
of (4b), and noting that Ai is column stochastic, we have
ϕ¯ik,t+1 = ϕ¯
i
k,t + g¯
i
k(xt+1)− g¯ik(xt).
Recursively expanding the above relation and noting that
ϕik,0 = g
i
k(x0) completes the proof.
For 2), following the result of part 1) and Lemma 2-2), we
obtain
E[ϕ¯ik,t|Ht] = E[g¯ik(xt)|Ht]
=
1
ni
1>niE[g
i
k|Ht] =
1
ni
1>ni∇xik f
i
µ = ∇xikf
i
µ(xt).
For 3), it follows that
E[‖ϕ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖22|Ht] = E[‖g¯ik(xt)−∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖22|Ht]
=
1
n2i
E[‖1>nigik(xt)− 1>ni∇xik f
i
µ(xt)‖22|Ht]
=
1
n2i
ni∑
j=1
E[‖gijk(xt)−∇xikf
i
j,µ(xt)‖22|Ht]
≤ 2
n2i
ni∑
j=1
E[‖gijk(xt)‖22|Ht] +
2
n2i
ni∑
j=1
E[‖∇xikf
i
j,µ(xt)‖22|Ht].
Applying Lemma 2-3) obtains the desired result.
In the next lemma, we quantify the gradient tracking error
‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi .
Lemma 5: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the gradient tracking
error ‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi ,∀k ∈ Vi, i ∈ N satisfies
E[‖ϕik,t+1 −Ai∞ϕik,t+1‖2νi |Ht] ≤
1 + σ2Ai
2
E[‖ϕik,t
−Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht] +
4ni(1 + σ
2
Ai)L2α2max
ν(1− σ2Ai)
E[‖ϕt‖22|Ht],
where σAi , ‖Ai −Ai∞‖νi .
Proof: It is obtained from (4b) that
‖ϕik,t+1 −Ai∞ϕik,t+1‖2νi = ‖Aiϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi
+ ‖(Ini −Ai∞)(gik(xt+1)− gik(xt))‖2νi + 2〈Aiϕik,t
−Ai∞ϕik,t, (Ini −Ai∞)(gik(xt+1)− gik(xt))〉νi .
Define σAi , ‖Ai−Ai∞‖νi . It is noted that ‖Ini −Ai∞‖νi =
1 from Lemma 1, taking the conditional expectation on Ht
yields
E[‖ϕik,t+1 −Ai∞ϕik,t+1‖2νi |Ht]
≤ σ2AiE[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]
+ E[‖gik(xt+1)− gik(xt)‖2νi |Ht]
+ 2E[‖Aiϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖νi‖gik(xt+1)− gik(xt)‖νi |Ht]
≤ σ2AiE[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]
+ E[‖gik(xt+1)− gik(xt)‖2νi |Ht]
+
1− σ2Ai
2
E[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]
+
2σ2Ai
1− σ2Ai
E[‖gik(xt+1)− gik(xt)‖2νi |Ht]
≤ 1 + σ
2
Ai
2
E[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]
+
1 + σ2Ai
1− σ2Ai
E[‖gik(xt+1)− gik(xt)‖2νi |Ht]. (5)
From Lemma 2-3), we have
E[‖gik(xt+1)− gik(xt)‖2νi |Ht] ≤
4niL2
ν
E[‖xt+1 − xt‖22|Ht]
=
4niL2
ν
E[‖PX [xt − diag(α)ϕt]− xt‖22|Ht]
≤ 4niL
2α2max
ν
E[‖ϕt‖22|Ht],
where the projection’s non-expansive property and ‖α‖2 =
αmax have been applied in the last inequality. Substituting the
above result to (5) completes the proof.
The next lemma provides a bound on the stacked gradient
tracker ϕik,t.
Lemma 6: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the stacked gradient
tracker {ϕik,t}t≥0,∀k ∈ Vi, i ∈ N holds that
E[‖ϕik,t‖22|Ht] ≤ 3νE[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]
+ 3ni(ni + 4)ι
2D2.
Proof: It is noted that
‖ϕik,t‖2 ≤ ‖ϕik,t − vi1>niϕik,t‖2 + ‖vi1>niϕik,t‖2
≤
√
ν‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖νi + niι‖ϕ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖2
+ niι‖∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖2
≤
√
ν‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖νi + niι‖ϕ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖2
+ niιD,
where ‖∇xikf iµ(xt)‖2 ≤ 1/ni
∑ni
j=1 ‖∇xikf ij,µ(xt)‖2 and
Lemma 2-3) have been applied in the last inequality. Squaring
both sides and applying 2‖x‖2‖y‖2 ≤ ‖x‖22 + ‖y‖22, we have
‖ϕik,t‖22 ≤ 3ν‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi
+ 3n2i ι
2‖ϕ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖22 + 3n2i ι2D2.
The proof is completed by taking the conditional expectation
on Ht on both sides and substituting Lemma 4-3).
Thus, following the result in Lemma 6, it can be obtained that
E[‖ϕt‖22|Ht]
=
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕikk,t‖22|Ht] ≤
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t‖22|Ht]
≤ 3ν
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]
+ 3
N∑
i=1
n2i (ni + 4)ι
2D2. (6)
Combining the above result with Lemma 5 and taking the limit
that µij → 0,∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N yields
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t+1 −Ai∞ϕik,t+1‖2νi |Ht]
=
(
1 + σ¯2
2
+
12νL2ςα2max
ν
N∑
i=1
n2i
)
×
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]
+
12ι2L2D2ςα2max
ν
( N∑
i=1
n2i
)( N∑
i=1
n2i (ni + 4)
)
, (7)
where we denote σ¯ , maxi∈N σAi and ς , maxi∈N
(1+σ2
Ai
)
1−σ2
Ai
.
Then, we quantify the gap between all agents’ actions xt
and the NE x∗ of game Γ in the following lemma.
Lemma 7: Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the agents’ actions
xt satisfies that
E[‖xt+1 − x∗‖2ν |Ht] ≤ (1− νχα¯)‖xt − x∗‖2ν
+
(
3να2max
ν
+
2α2max
νχα¯
) N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]
+
3ι2D2α2max
ν
N∑
i=1
n2i (ni + 4) +
2νNnD22αα¯
νχ
.
when the smoothing parameter µij ,∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N tends to 0.
Proof: Subtracting both sides of (4a) by x∗µ
xt+1 − x∗µ = PX [xt − diag(α)ϕt]− x∗µ.
Taking the norm and applying the projection’s non-expansive
property
‖xt+1 − x∗µ‖2ν = ‖PX [xt − diag(α)ϕt]− x∗µ‖2ν
≤ ‖xt − x∗µ − diag(α)ϕt‖2ν
≤ ‖xt − x∗µ‖2ν +
α2max
ν
‖ϕt‖22
− 2〈xt − x∗µ, diag(α)(ϕt − diag(ν)Φµ(xt))〉ν (8a)
− 2〈xt − x∗µ, diag(α− α¯)diag(ν)Φµ(xt)〉ν (8b)
− 2α¯〈xt − x∗µ, diag(ν)Φµ(xt)〉ν . (8c)
For (8a), it follows that
− 2〈xt − x∗µ, diag(α)(ϕt − diag(ν)Φµ(xt))〉ν
= −2
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
αik〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ,
ϕikk,t − nivik∇xikf
i
µ(xt)〉nivik
= −2
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
αik〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, ϕikk,t − nivikϕ¯ik,t〉nivik
− 2
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
αik〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ,
niv
i
k(ϕ¯
i
k,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt))〉nivik .
The first part holds that
− 2
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
αik〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, ϕikk,t − nivikϕ¯ik,t〉nivik
= −2
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
αik〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, ϕikk,t − vik1>niϕik,t〉nivik
≤ 2αmax
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
‖xik,t − xi∗k,µ‖nivik‖ϕ
i
kk,t − vik1>niϕik,t‖nivik
≤ νχα¯
2
‖xt − x∗µ‖2ν +
2α2max
νχα¯
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
‖ϕikk,t − vik1>niϕik,t‖2nivik
≤ νχα¯
2
‖xt − x∗µ‖2ν +
2α2max
νχα¯
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi .
Taking the conditional expectation on Ht gives
E
[
− 2
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
αik〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, ϕikk,t − nivikϕ¯ik,t〉nivik
∣∣∣∣Ht]
≤ νχα¯
2
‖xt − x∗µ‖2ν +
2α2max
νχα¯
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t
−Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht].
For the second part, it follows from Lemma 4-2) that
E
[
− 2
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
αik〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ,
niv
i
k(ϕ¯
i
k,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt))〉nivik
∣∣∣∣Ht] = 0.
Combining the results of the above two parts, we obtain that
E[−2〈xt − x∗µ, diag(α)(ϕt − diag(ν)Φµ(xt))〉ν |Ht]
≤ νχα¯
2
‖xt − x∗µ‖2ν +
2α2max
νχα¯
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t
−Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]. (9)
For (8b), it follows that
− 2〈xt − x∗µ, diag(α− α¯)diag(ν)Φµ(xt)〉ν
≤ 2‖xt − x∗µ‖ν‖diag(ν)diag(α− α¯)Φµ(xt)‖ν
≤ νχα¯
2
‖xt − x∗µ‖2ν +
2ν
νχα¯
‖diag(α− α¯)Φµ(xt)‖22
≤ νχα¯
2
‖xt − x∗µ‖2ν +
2νNnD22αα¯
νχ
,
where the last inequality follows from Cauchy-Schwarz in-
equality and ‖Φµ(xt)‖22 ≤ ND2 due to Lemma 2-3). Taking
the conditional expectation on Ht gives
E[−2〈xt − x∗µ, diag(α− α¯)diag(ν)Φµ(xt)〉ν |Ht]
≤ νχα¯
2
‖xt − x∗µ‖2ν +
2νNnD22αα¯
νχ
. (10)
For (8c), it is noted that at NE x∗µ, [57, Prop. 1.4.2]
〈xt − x∗µ,Φµ(x∗µ)〉 ≥ 0,
Then, we have
− 2α¯〈xt − x∗µ, diag(ν)Φµ(xt)〉ν
= −2α¯〈xt − x∗µ,Φµ(xt)〉
≤ −2α¯〈xt − x∗µ,Φµ(xt)− Φµ(x∗µ)〉. (11)
Taking the conditional expectation on Ht for (8), and
substituting (6), (9), (10) and (11) yields
E[‖xt+1 − x∗µ‖2ν |Ht] ≤ (1 + νχα¯)‖xt − x∗µ‖2ν
+
(
3να2max
ν
+
2α2max
νχα¯
) N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]
+
3ι2D2α2max
ν
N∑
i=1
n2i (ni + 4) +
2νNnD22αα¯
νχ
− 2α¯〈xt − x∗µ,Φµ(xt)− Φµ(x∗µ)〉.
Taking the limit that µij → 0,∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N yields
E[‖xt+1 − x∗‖2ν |Ht] ≤ (1 + νχα¯)‖xt − x∗‖2ν
+
(
3να2max
ν
+
2α2max
νχα¯
) N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi |Ht]
+
3ι2D2α2max
ν
N∑
i=1
n2i (ni + 4) +
2νNnD22αα¯
νχ
− 2α¯〈xt − x∗,Φ0(xt)− Φ0(x∗)〉.
By Assumption 3 that
〈xt − x∗,Φ0(xt)− Φ0(x∗)〉
≥ χ‖xt − x∗‖22 ≥ νχ‖xt − x∗‖2ν ,
we obtain the desired result.
Now, we proceed to the analysis on the convergence of the
proposed algorithm with the following definitions.
Ψt ,
[
E[‖xt − x∗‖2ν ]∑N
i=1
∑ni
k=1 E[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi ]
]
,
M ,
[
1− k1α¯ k2α2max/α¯+ k3α2max
0 1− k5 + k4α2max
]
,
Υ ,
[
k6
2
αα¯+ k7α
2
max
k8α
2
max
]
.
where k1 , νχ, k2 , 2νχ , k3 ,
3ν
ν , k4 ,
12νL2ς
ν
∑N
i=1 n
2
i ,
k5 , 1−σ¯
2
2 , k6 ,
2νNnD2
νχ , k7 ,
3ι2D2
ν
∑N
i=1 n
2
i (ni + 4) and
k8 , 12ι
2L2D2ς
ν (
∑N
i=1 n
2
i )(
∑N
i=1 n
2
i (ni + 4)).
The following dynamical system can be obtained by taking
the total expectation on (7) and Lemma 7 .
Ψt+1 ≤MΨt + Υ. (12)
Then the convergence results of all agents’ actions to a
neighborhood of the unique NE x∗ can be derived in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Generate
the agent’s action {xij,t}t≥0 and gradient tracker {ϕijk,t}t≥0
by Algorithm 1 with the uncoordinated constant step-size αij
satisfying
0 < αmax < min
{
1
k1
,
√
k5
k4
}
.
Then, we have ρ(M) < 1, and sup`≥t E[‖x` − x∗‖2ν ]
(respectively, sup`≥t
∑N
i=1
∑ni
k=1 E[‖ϕik,`−Ai∞ϕik,`‖2νi ]) lin-
early converges to lim supt→∞ E[‖xt − x∗‖2ν ] (respectively,
lim supt→∞
∑N
i=1
∑ni
k=1 E[‖ϕik,t − Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi ]) at a rate of
ρ(M), when the smoothing parameter µij ,∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ N
tends to 0. Moreover,
lim sup
t→∞
E[‖xt − x∗‖2ν ] ≤ O((α − 1)2) +O(αmax)
lim sup
t→∞
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi ] ≤ O(α2max).
Proof: For the dynamical system (12), if ρ(M) < 1,
then M converges to 0 at a geometric rate with exponent
ρ(M) [58], which implies that sup`≥t E[‖x` − x∗‖2ν ] and
sup`≥t
∑N
i=1
∑ni
k=1 E[‖ϕik,`−Ai∞ϕik,`‖2νi ], respectively, con-
verge to some neighborhood of 0 with the same rate.
It is noted that M is upper triangular. Then, we have
ρ(M) = max{|1− k1α¯|, 1− k5 + k4α2max}.
To satisfy ρ(M) < 1, one needs to require
|1− k1α¯| < 1, 1− k5 + k4α2max < 1.
To ensure that the above two inequalities always hold, it
suffices to have
0 < αmax < min
{
1
k1
,
√
k5
k4
}
by noting that α¯ ≤ αmax.
Furthermore, taking the limsup on both sides of (12) gives
lim sup
t→∞
Ψt ≤M lim sup
t→∞
Ψt + Υ,
we obtain
(I2 −M) lim sup
t→∞
Ψt ≤ Υ.
Denote that
I2 −M =
[
k1α¯ −(k2α2max/α¯+ k3α2max)
0 k5 − k4α2max
]
,
[
a −b
0 d
]
.
It can be obtained that
det(I2 −M) = (k5 − k4α2max)k1α¯ > 0, (13)
Hence, I2 −M is invertible. Then, we can obtain that
lim sup
t→∞
E[‖xt − x∗‖2ν ]
≤ [(I2 −M)−1Υ]1 = 1
det(I2 −M)
[
d b
]
Υ
≤ (k6
2
αα¯+ k7α
2
max)(k5 − k4α2max)
(k5 − k4α2max)k1α¯
+
k8α
2
max(k2α
2
max/α¯+ k3α
2
max)
(k5 − k4α2max)k1α¯
= O(2α) +O(αmax),
and
lim sup
t→∞
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖ϕik,t −Ai∞ϕik,t‖2νi ]
≤ [(I2 −M)−1Υ]2 = 1
det(I2 −M)
[
0 a
]
Υ
≤ k8α
2
maxk1α¯
(k5 − k4α2max)k1α¯
= O(α2max),
which completes the proof.
Remark 3: Theorem 1 characterizes the convergence per-
formance of the proposed algorithm. It shows that the agents’
actions converge to a neighborhood of the NE linearly with the
error bounded by two terms: one is proportional to the largest
step-size, and the other is proportional to the heterogeneity
of the step-size. When the step-size and its heterogeneity get
smaller, the error bound also decreases, leading to a better
accuracy.
Next, we derive both upper and lower bounds for the rate
of convergence ρ(M) under the conditions in Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: Under the conditions in Theorem 1, we have
1− −k
2
1 + k1
√
k21 + 4k4k5
2k4
≤ ρ(M) < 1.
Proof: Under the range of αmax in Theorem 1, we have
ρ(M) = max{1− k1α¯, 1− k5 + k4α2max}.
For the upper bound of ρ(M), when all step-sizes are close
to 0, we have ρ(M) close to 1. Hence, ρ(M) < 1.
For the lower bound of ρ(M), it is equivalent to solve
min max{1− k1α¯, 1− k5 + k4α2max}.
It is noted that 1− k1α¯ ≥ 1− k1αmax. By solving that
1− k1αmax = 1− k5 + k4α2max,
which gives
αs ,
−k1 +
√
k21 + 4k4k5
2k4
.
It is easy to verify that αs < 1/k1 and αs <
√
k5/k4. Thus,
the lower bound is given by
ρ(M) ≥ 1− αs = 1− −k
2
1 + k1
√
k21 + 4k4k5
2k4
,
when α¯ = αmax = αs, i.e., uniform constant step-sizes for all
agents.
Remark 4: Corrollary 1 characeterizes both the upper and
lower bounds for the rate of convergence of the proposed
algorithm, which is determined by ρ(M). The rate of conver-
gence increases with larger step-sizes in general. The fastest
rate is obtained when all step-sizes are identical (i.e., zero
heterogeneity) and equal to αs.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
We illustrate the proposed NE seeking strategy on a classical
Cournot competition game [16], [17], [34], [44], followed by
a connectivity control game [27], [47].
A. Cournot Competition Game
In this part, we consider a Cournot competition game:
there are N parent companies, where each parent company
i owns ni subsidiary companies for the production. The game
is played among the parent companies to compete for better
profits by adjusting the quantity produced, which needs the co-
operation among the subsidiary companies. Specifically, each
subsidiary company j of a parent company i has an individual
production cost Qij(x
i
j) and a profit p
i
j(x)x
i
j for producing
the quantity xij . It is noted that the price function p
i
j(x) is
dependent on the production of other (parent) companies. Let
xij denote the action of a subsidiary company j (referred to
as an agent) of a parent company i (referred to as a cluster).
Then, the function to be minimized by this agent is given by
f ij(x) = Q
i
j(x
i
j)− pij(x)xij .
Fig. 1. Communication network.
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Fig. 2. Trajectories of agents’ actions in cluster 1.
In particular, we consider a linear price function given by
pij(x) = c
i
j − bi>j x,
where cij > 0 is a constant, b
i
j ∈ Rn is a vector with each
element being either 1 or 0 depending on the coupling. Specif-
ically, the corresponding element is 1 if the price function is
dependent on that action, and 0 otherwise.
In this simulation, we consider N = 4 and ni = 6. The
individual production cost Qij(x
i
j) is given by the following
non-smooth quadratic function
Qij(x
i
j) = 5(x
i
j)
2 + 5xij + 5|xij − 6j|.
Constant cij is set to 60, and b
i
j is randomly generated. Then, it
is readily verified that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Suppose the
directed communication graph for each cluster i is depicted
in Fig. 1. Then, its associated column stochastic adjacency
matrix Ai can be easily designed by setting aijk to 1/dego(k)
if (k, j) ∈ E i and 0 otherwise, where dego(k) represents the
out-degree of agent k. For the algorithm parameters, we let
the smoothing parameter be µik = 0.1/k + 1, and the constant
step-sizes for agents of cluster i be αij = 0.1, 0.08, 0.06, 0.04,
0.02 and 0.01, respectively. Hence, α = 0.6163. We initialize
Algorithm 1 with arbitrary xij,0 and ϕ
i
jk,0 = g
i
jk(x0). The
trajectories of the agents’ actions for four clusters are plotted
in Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. It can be observed that the
actions of all agents can almost converge to the NE.
In the next experiment, we illustrate the convergence rate
results. First, we set the constant step-sizes for agents of
cluster i be αij = 0.1a, 0.08a, 0.06a, 0.04a, 0.02a and 0.02a,
respectively, and let a = 1.2, 1 and 0.6, respectively. Hence,
we fix the heterogeneity of the step-size at α = 0.5590,
and set the largest step-size to αmax = 0.12, 0.10 and 0.06,
respectively. The trajectories of the error gap ‖xt−x∗‖ with all
these step-sizes are plotted in Fig. 6. As can be observed from
Fig. 6, the error gap descends linearly in the log-scale plot
for all cases. Besides, the convergence speed decreases with
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Fig. 3. Trajectories of agents’ actions in cluster 2.
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Fig. 4. Trajectories of agents’ actions in cluster 3.
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Fig. 5. Trajectories of agents’ actions in cluster 4.
the decrease of the largest step-size (also other step-sizes due
to fixed heterogeneity), but leads to a better accuracy, which
verifies the derived results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Next,
we fix the largest step-size to αmax = 0.1 and the averaged
step-size α¯ = 0.06, and set the heterogeneity of the step-size
α = 0.4303, 0.5182, 0.6161 and 0.6667, respectively. The
trajectories of the error gap ‖xt−x∗‖ with all these step-sizes
are plotted in Fig. 7. As can be seen from Fig. 7, the error gap
is smaller with a smaller heterogeneity of the step-size, and
the convergence rate is faster due to less number of smaller
step-sizes. Hence, the results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
have been verified.
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B. Connectivity Control Game
In this part, we consider a connectivity control game played
among a number of sensor networks. Specifically, there are
N sensor networks, where each sensor network contains ni
sensors. Let xij = [x
i
j,1, x
i
j,2]
> ∈ R2 denote the position
of sensor j (referred to as an agent) from a sensor network
i (referred to as a cluster). Then, this sensor aims to seek
a tradeoff between a local cost, lij(x
i) (e.g., source seeking
and positioning) and the global cost, hij(x) (e.g., connectivity
preservation with other sensor networks) [27], [47]. Hence,
the cost function to be minimized by this sensor is given by
f ij(x) = l
i
j(x
i) + hij(x),
where
lij(x
i) = xi>aijx
i + bi>j x
i + cij ,
hij(x) =
∑
k∈Ni
dij‖eijkxij − xk‖22,
and aij , b
i
j , c
i
j , d
i
j , e
i
jk are constant matrices or vectors of ap-
propriate dimensions, and Ni stands for the set of neighbors
of sensor network i in a connected graph characterizing
their position dependence. Specifically, if k ∈ Ni, then the
corresponding term ‖eijkxij −xk‖22 represents the intention of
sensor j from a sensor network i to preserve the connectivity
with the sensors from sensor network k.
In this simulation, we consider N = 3 and ni = 4. The
local and global costs are set as lij = i[‖xij‖22 + 1>2 xij + j]
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Fig. 8. Trajectories of sensors’ positions in network 1.
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Fig. 9. Trajectories of sensors’ positions in network 2.
for j = 1, . . . , 4, i = 1, 2, 3 and h1j = ‖x1j − x2j‖22, h2j =
‖x2j − x1j‖22 + ‖x2j − x3j‖22, h3j = ‖x3j − x2j‖22 for j = 1, . . . , 4.
Then, it is readily verified that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold.
Consider the directed communication graph for each sensor
network i as shown in Fig. 1, its associated column stochastic
adjacency matrix Ai can be designed as described in the same
way as depicted in Section V-A. For the algorithm parameters,
we let the smoothing parameter be µik = 0.1/k + 1, and the
constant step-sizes for sensors of network i be αij = 0.1,
0.08, 0.04 and 0.02, respectively. Thus, α = 0.5270. We
initialize Algorithm 1 with arbitrary xij,0 and ϕ
i
jk,0 = g
i
jk(x0).
The trajectories of the sensors’ positions for the three sensor
networks are plotted in Figs. 8, 9 and 10, respectively. It can
be seen that the positions of all sensors can almost converge
to the NE. Also, more ‘zigzags’ can be observed for the case
of a larger step-size, since the update is more aggressive.
Next, we illustrate the convergence rate results. First, we set
the constant step-sizes for sensors of network i be αij = 0.1a,
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Fig. 10. Trajectories of sensors’ positions in network 3.
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0.08a, 0.04a and 0.02a, respectively, and let a = 1.2, 1 and
0.6, respectively. Hence, we fix the heterogeneity of the step-
size α = 0.5270, and set the largest step-size to αmax = 0.12,
0.1 and 0.06, respectively. The trajectories of the error gap
‖xt − x∗‖ with these settings are plotted in Fig. 11. Then,
we fix the largest step-size to αmax = 0.1 and the averaged
step-size α¯ = 0.06, and set the heterogeneity of the step-size
α = 0.4714, 0.5893 and 0.6667, respectively. The trajectories
of the error gap ‖xt − x∗‖ with these settings are plotted
in Fig. 12. As can be seen from both figures, the error gap
descends linearly for all cases. Moreover, the convergence
speed decreases with smaller step-sizes, and the error gap
decreases with smaller step-sizes and smaller heterogeneity of
the step-size, which verifies the derived results in Theorem 1
and Corollary 1.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This work has studied an N -cluster non-cooperative game
problem, where the agents’ cost functions are possibly non-
smooth and the explicit expressions are unknown. By inte-
grating the Gaussian smoothing techniques with the gradi-
ent tracking, a gradient-free NE seeking algorithm has been
developed, in which the agents are allowed to select their
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Fig. 12. Trajectories of the error gap ‖xt − x∗‖2.
own preferred constant step-sizes. We have shown that, when
the largest step-size is sufficiently small, the agents’ actions
approximately converge to the unique NE under a strongly
monotone game mapping condition, and the error gap is
proportional to the largest step-size and the heterogeneity of
the step-size. Furthermore, we have derived both upper and
lower bounds for the rate of convergence of the proposed
algorithm. Finally, the derived results have been verified by
numerical simulations.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Ram, V. Veeravalli, and A. Nedic, “Distributed and Recursive Pa-
rameter Estimation in Parametrized Linear State-Space Models,” IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 488–492, 2010.
[2] M. Rabbat and R. Nowak, “Decentralized source localization and track-
ing [wireless sensor networks],” in 2004 IEEE International Conference
on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, vol. 3, 2004, pp. iii–921–4.
[3] C. Li, X. Yu, T. Huang, and X. He, “Distributed Optimal Consensus over
Resource Allocation Network and Its Application to Dynamical Eco-
nomic Dispatch,” IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning
Systems, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 2407–2418, 2018.
[4] L. Bai, M. Ye, C. Sun, and G. Hu, “Distributed Economic Dispatch
Control via Saddle Point Dynamics and Consensus Algorithms,” IEEE
Transactions on Control Systems Technology, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 898–
905, 2019.
[5] Z. Feng, C. Sun, and G. Hu, “Robust Connectivity Preserving Ren-
dezvous of Multirobot Systems Under Unknown Dynamics and Dis-
turbances,” IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, vol. 4,
no. 4, pp. 725–735, 2017.
[6] E. Altman and L. Wynter, “Equilibrium, Games, and Pricing in Trans-
portation and Telecommunication Networks,” Networks and Spatial
Economics, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 7–21, mar 2004.
[7] C. Saraydar, N. Mandayam, and D. Goodman, “Efficient power control
via pricing in wireless data networks,” IEEE Transactions on Commu-
nications, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 291–303, 2002.
[8] J. Wang, Y. Pang, and G. Hu, “Social profit optimization of competitive
electricity market: A leader-following approach,” in Chinese Control
Conference, CCC, 2019, pp. 7494–7499.
[9] M. Ye and G. Hu, “Game Design and Analysis for Price-Based Demand
Response: An Aggregate Game Approach,” IEEE Transactions on
Cybernetics, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 720–730, 2017.
[10] M. Ye and G. Hu, “Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking by a Consen-
sus Based Approach,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 62,
no. 9, pp. 4811–4818, 2017.
[11] M. Ye and G. Hu, “Distributed nash equilibrium seeking in multiagent
games under switching communication topologies,” IEEE Transactions
on Cybernetics, vol. 48, no. 11, pp. 3208–3217, 2018.
[12] D. Gadjov and L. Pavel, “A Passivity-Based Approach to Nash Equilib-
rium Seeking Over Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 1077–1092, 2019.
[13] C. De Persis and S. Grammatico, “Distributed averaging integral Nash
equilibrium seeking on networks,” Automatica, vol. 110, p. 108548,
2019.
[14] C. Sun and G. Hu, “Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Gen-
eralized Convex Games with Shared Constraints,” Journal of Physics:
Conference Series, vol. 1016, no. 1, p. 012012, 2018.
[15] K. Lu, G. Jing, and L. Wang, “Distributed Algorithms for Searching
Generalized Nash Equilibrium of Noncooperative Games,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Cybernetics, vol. 49, no. 6, pp. 2362–2371, 2019.
[16] P. Yi and L. Pavel, “An operator splitting approach for distributed
generalized Nash equilibria computation,” Automatica, vol. 102, pp.
111–121, 2019.
[17] L. Pavel, “Distributed GNE seeking under partial-decision information
over networks via a doubly-augmented operator splitting approach,”
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 1584–1597,
2020.
[18] S. Grammatico, “Dynamic Control of Agents Playing Aggregative
Games with Coupling Constraints,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 62, no. 9, pp. 4537–4548, 2017.
[19] S. Liang, P. Yi, and Y. Hong, “Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of a
class of aggregative games,” in 2017 13th IEEE International Conference
on Control & Automation (ICCA), 2017, pp. 58–63.
[20] G. Belgioioso and S. Grammatico, “A Douglas-Rachford Splitting for
Semi-decentralized Equilibrium Seeking in Generalized Aggregative
Games,” in 2018 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC),
2018, pp. 3541–3546.
[21] Z. Deng and X. Nian, “Distributed Generalized Nash Equilibrium Seek-
ing Algorithm Design for Aggregative Games Over Weight-Balanced
Digraphs,” IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Sys-
tems, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 695–706, 2019.
[22] C. De Persis and S. Grammatico, “Continuous-Time Integral Dynamics
for a Class of Aggregative Games With Coupling Constraints,” IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 65, no. 5, pp. 2171–2176, 2020.
[23] S. Grammatico, F. Parise, M. Colombino, and J. Lygeros, “Decentralized
Convergence to Nash Equilibria in Constrained Deterministic Mean
Field Control,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 61, no. 11,
pp. 3315–3329, 2016.
[24] Y. Zhang, S. Liang, X. Wang, and H. Ji, “Distributed Nash Equilib-
rium Seeking for Aggregative Games With Nonlinear Dynamics Under
External Disturbances,” IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, pp. 1–10,
2019.
[25] Z. Deng and S. Liang, “Distributed algorithms for aggregative games
of multiple heterogeneous EulerLagrange systems,” Automatica, vol. 99,
pp. 246–252, 2019.
[26] A. Romano and L. Pavel, “Dynamic NE Seeking for Multi-Integrator
Networked Agents with Disturbance Rejection,” IEEE Transactions on
Control of Network Systems, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 129–139, 2020.
[27] M. Ye, “Distributed Robust Seeking of Nash Equilibrium for Networked
Games: An Extended State Observer-Based Approach,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Cybernetics, pp. 1–12, 2020.
[28] B. Gharesifard and J. Cortes, “Distributed convergence to Nash equi-
libria in two-network zero-sum games,” Automatica, vol. 49, no. 6, pp.
1683–1692, 2013.
[29] Y. Lou, Y. Hong, L. Xie, G. Shi, and K. H. Johansson, “Nash Equi-
librium Computation in Subnetwork Zero-Sum Games With Switching
Communications,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 61,
no. 10, pp. 2920–2935, 2016.
[30] M. Ye, G. Hu, and F. Lewis, “Nash equilibrium seeking for N-coalition
noncooperative games,” Automatica, vol. 95, pp. 266–272, 2018.
[31] M. Ye and G. Hu, “Simultaneous social cost minimization and nash
equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative games,” in Chinese Control
Conference, CCC. IEEE Computer Society, 2017, pp. 3052–3059.
[32] M. Ye and G. Hu, “A distributed method for simultaneous social cost
minimization and nash equilibrium seeking in multi-agent games,” in
IEEE International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA, 2017,
pp. 799–804.
[33] M. Ye, G. Hu, F. L. Lewis, and L. Xie, “A Unified Strategy for
Solution Seeking in Graphical N-Coalition Noncooperative Games,”
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 64, no. 11, pp. 4645–
4652, 2019.
[34] X. Zeng, J. Chen, S. Liang, and Y. Hong, “Generalized Nash equilib-
rium seeking strategy for distributed nonsmooth multi-cluster game,”
Automatica, vol. 103, pp. 20–26, 2019.
[35] M. Ye, G. Hu, and S. Xu, “An extremum seeking-based approach for
Nash equilibrium seeking in N-cluster noncooperative games,” Automat-
ica, vol. 114, p. 108815, 2020.
[36] Y. Nesterov and V. Spokoiny, “Random Gradient-Free Minimization of
Convex Functions,” Foundations of Computational Mathematics, vol. 17,
no. 2, pp. 527–566, 2017.
[37] D. Yuan and D. W. C. Ho, “Randomized Gradient-Free Method for
Multiagent Optimization Over Time-Varying Networks,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems, vol. 26, no. 6, pp.
1342–1347, 2015.
[38] D. Yuan, D. W. C. Ho, and S. Xu, “Zeroth-Order Method for Distributed
Optimization With Approximate Projections,” IEEE Transactions on
Neural Networks and Learning Systems, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 284–294,
2016.
[39] Y. Pang and G. Hu, “A distributed optimization method with unknown
cost function in a multi-agent system via randomized gradient-free
method,” in 2017 11th Asian Control Conference (ASCC), 2017, pp.
144–149.
[40] Y. Pang and G. Hu, “Exact Convergence of Gradient-Free Distributed
Optimization Method in a Multi-Agent System,” in 2018 IEEE 58th
Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2018, pp. 5728–5733.
[41] Y. Pang and G. Hu, “Randomized Gradient-Free Distributed Online
Optimization with Time-Varying Cost Functions,” in 2019 IEEE 58th
Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2019, pp. 4910–4915.
[42] Y. Pang and G. Hu, “Randomized Gradient-Free Distributed Optimiza-
tion Methods for a Multi-Agent System with Unknown Cost Function,”
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 333–340,
2020.
[43] Y. Pang and G. Hu, “Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking with
Limited Cost Function Knowledge via A Consensus-Based Gradient-
Free Method,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2020.
[44] T. Tatarenko and M. Kamgarpour, “Learning Generalized Nash Equi-
libria in a Class of Convex Games,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 1426–1439, 2019.
[45] T. Tatarenko and M. Kamgarpour, “Learning Nash Equilibria in Mono-
tone Games,” in 2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC), 2019, pp. 3104–3109.
[46] S. J. Liu and M. Krstic, “Stochastic Nash equilibrium seeking for
games with general nonlinear payoffs,” SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 1659–1679, 2011.
[47] M. S. Stankovic, K. H. Johansson, and D. M. Stipanovic, “Distributed
Seeking of Nash Equilibria With Applications to Mobile Sensor Net-
works,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 57, no. 4, pp.
904–919, 2012.
[48] M. Ye and G. Hu, “Distributed Seeking of Time-Varying Nash Equi-
librium for Non-Cooperative Games,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 60, no. 11, pp. 3000–3005, 2015.
[49] A. Nedic´, A. Olshevsky, Shi, and Wei, “Achieving geometric conver-
gence for distributed optimization over time-varying graphs,” SIAM
Journal on Optimization, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 2597–2633, dec 2017.
[50] W. Shi, Q. Ling, G. Wu, and W. Yin, “EXTRA: An Exact First-Order
Algorithm for Decentralized Consensus Optimization,” SIAM Journal
on Optimization, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 944–966, 2015.
[51] C. Xi and U. A. Khan, “ADD-OPT: Accelerated Distributed Directed
Optimization,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 63, no. 5,
pp. 1329–1339, 2018.
[52] R. Xin, A. K. Sahu, U. A. Khan, and S. Kar, “Distributed stochastic
optimization with gradient tracking over strongly-connected networks,”
in 2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2019,
pp. 8353–8358.
[53] S. Pu and A. Nedic´, “Distributed stochastic gradient tracking methods,”
Mathematical Programming, pp. 1–49, 2020.
[54] G. Debreu, “A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 38, no. 10, pp. 886–893, 1952.
[55] I. L. Glicksberg, “A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point
Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points,” Proceedings of
the American Mathematical Society, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 170, 1952.
[56] P. Jacquot and C. Wan, “Nonsmooth Aggregative Games with Coupling
Constraints and Infinitely Many Classes of Players,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1806.06230, 2018.
[57] F. Facchinei and J. Pang, Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities
and Complementarity Problems. New York, NY: Springer New York,
2003.
[58] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, Matrix Analysis. Cambridge university
press, 1990.
